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The Supreme Court Continues Its Journey Down
the Ever Narrowing Paths of Section 1983 and
the Due Process Clause: An Analysis of
Parratt P. Taylor
After nearly a century of quiet slumber, the Supreme Court awoke the
sleeping giant. In the past two decades, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has evolved into a
judicial Frankenstein monster. Unable to control the beast, the Court has
attempted to restrict the creature's movements by unnecessarily limiting its
constitutional source. If followed to its logical conclusion, the Court's nar-
row reading of the Constitution may ultimately demote all due process mo-
lations to state tort remedies. This note traces the legislative and judicial
evolution of section 1983 as well as the statute's present interaction with
the due process clause. The vehicle for this examination will be Parratt v.
Taylor, a recent Supreme Court decision which presents both dubious
ramifications for section 1983 actions involving negligent deprivations of
life, liberty, and property, and an opportunity to examine the changing
course of the Court. More specifically, the inquiry will focus upon the state
of mind requirement of section 1983, the legislative mandate for a supple-
mental remedy, and an examination of present distortions of the spirit and
purpose of section 1983.
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
Bert Taylor, Jr., an inmate in the Nebraska Penal and Correc-
tional Complex, mail ordered hobby materials valued at $23.50.1
Packages received by mail were normally delivered directly to
each prisoner or the prisoner was notified to pick up the package
at the central mail room. However, before his packages arrived,2
Taylor was placed in the Adjustment Center and consequently
was unable to receive his order because packages were not al-
lowed in the restricted area.3
Upon his release from the Adjustment Center, Taylor requested
his hobby materials. After a failure by prison officials to respond
to his requests for the packages, Taylor contacted the grievance
supervisor about the matter. The supervisor was unable to locate
the packages and Taylor never received his order.4
After repeated correspondence with the United States District
1. Taylor v. Parratt, No. 76-L-57, slip op. at 1 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 1978).
2. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 5, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
3. Taylor v. Parratt, No. 76-L-57, slip op. at 1 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 1978).
4. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 5, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 US. 527 (1981).
Court for the District of Nebraska, Taylor commenced an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 19835 by filing a handwritten pro se complaint.
Taylor contended "that his rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States were violated. That
he was deprived of his property and Due Process of Law." 6 He
prayed for a declaration that the acts of the prison warden and
hobby manager violated his civil rights; for compensatory dam-
ages of $1,000 from each petitioner; and for punitive damages of
$1,000 from hobby manager Lugenbill.7
The district court held that the prison officials' negligent con-
duct violated Taylor's fourteenth amendment due process rights
and granted summary judgment for respondent.8 The court of ap-
peals affirmed without opinion.9 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari' 0 and subsequently reversed the lower
court's decision." In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the
Court held that although section 1983 provides a remedy for a
negligent deprivation of property, the existence of state tort reme-
dies to redress losses similar to respondent's precluded a finding
of a due process violation.12
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History: Origins in the Ku Klux Klan Act
Section 1983 first came onto the books as section one of the Ku
Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871.13 It was one means by which
Congress exercised the power vested in it by section five of the
fourteenth amendment to enforce the provisions of that amend-
ment.14 The purpose of the legislation was plainly evidenced by
5. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
6. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 6, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
7. Id. The petitioners were Robert Parratt, the warden, and Francis
Lugenbill, the hobby manager of the prison.
8. See 451 U.S. at 529.
9. Taylor v. Parratt, 620 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1980), per curiam (decided without
published opinion), rev'd, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
10. 449 U.S. 917 (1980).
11. 451 U.S. at 544.
12. Id.
13. The Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
14. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68, 80, 83-85 (1871). [Citations
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its title: "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for
other Purposes."' 5
The Ku Klux Klan Act evolved out of a message sent to the
Congress by President Grant on March 23, 1871, which read in
part:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering
life and property insecure.... That the power to correct these evils is
beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of
the Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of existing
laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I ur-
gently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall
effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in
all parts of the United States.... 6
A compelling concern of the proponents for legislation was the in-
creasing depredations of the Ku Klux Klan. Congressman Cobb
of North Carolina spoke of the "social and political disability" im-
posed on Negroes and the White Republicans protested the "vio-
lence and lawlessness." 7
The Congressional debates "were replete with references to the
lawless conditions" of the South in 1871. The racial tensions of
the era were exacerbated by the relative inaction of state and lo-
cal governments.' 8 Senator Pool stated that no member of the
Klan has ever "feared any punishment for a crime committed in
pursuance of the orders of the Klan."19 Because of the strength
and secrecy of the Klan, member's actions went virtually unchal-
lenged.20 In short, the statute was aimed at correcting a situation
bordering on anarchy.
from the CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE hereinafter cited as GLOBE; materials in the
GLOBE APPENDIX hereinafter cited as GLOBE APP.].
15. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
16. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 244 (quoted in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-73
(1961)).
17. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 439. For treatment of the Klan era, see generally
J.G. RANDALL & D. DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 682-84 (2d ed.
1961); E. COULTER, THE SOUTH DURING RECONSTRUCTION 165-71 (1947).
18. 365 U.S. at 174.
19. GLOBE APP., supra note 14, at 172.
20. Senator Nye, commenting on the recent outbreaks of violence, emphasized
his desire that:
these crimes must be stopped everywhere. I would have a law that would
protect the citizen of the lowliest character upon the farthest frontier, a
law that should make him safe, sitting under his own vine and fig tree,
with no one and no combination to molest him or make him afraid; and
until that time comes this nation has not performed its duty.
GLOBE, supra note 14, at 659.
The importance of the statute should not be underestimated.
The scope of power granted by the bill was forcefully objected to
by its opponents.2 1 Although the legislation had several purposes,
a reading of the entire section indicates three primary aims.22
First, it had the potential to override certain kinds of state laws. 23
However, as noted by Mr. Sloss of Alabama, this feature was irrel-
evant because contrary state legislation did not exist.24 "Second,
it provided a remedy where state laws were inadequate." 25 Fi-
nally, "it was to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy,
though adequate in theory, was not available in practice." 26 The
main opposition to this final feature was that "Jilt overrides the
reserved powers of the States."27
Despite the fears expressed by legislators concerning the impli-
cations of the bill, it was nonetheless passed by the Forty-Second
Congress and has subsequently been codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.28
An examination of the debates surrounding the Act indicate that
its framers obviously contemplated a .bill of tremendous scope.
They intended to significantly expand federal jurisdiction into ar-
eas previously viewed as strictly local concerns. Against this
backdrop of apparent expansionism, it is necessary to balance the
specific evil at which the bill was aimed - the ever increasing
political and s6cial power of the Klan. The South was in a state of
near anarchy; it was a time of lawlessness, senseless brutality,
and an ever increasing inability of the government to protect the
21. Senator Thurman, an opponent of the bill, described the proposed act at
the time it was passed:
[This section's] whole effect is to give to the federal judiciary that which
now does not belong to it - a jurisdiction that may be constitutionally
conferred upon it, I grant, but that has never yet been conferred upon it.
It authorizes any person who is deprived of any right, privilege, or immu-
nity secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, to bring an
action against the wrong-doer in the Federal courts, and without any limit
whatsoever as to the amount in controversy [which] may be of the slight-
est conceivable character, the damages . . .may be . . .merely nominal
damages; and yet. . . this section. . . in effect may transfer the hearing of
all such cases into the Federal courts.
GLOBE, supra note 14, at 216-17.
22. 365 U.S. at 173.
23. Id.
24. GLOBE App., supra note 14, at 268.
25. 365 U.S. at 173.
26. Id. at 174.
27. GLOBE Ap., supra note 14, at 365. The speaker, Mr. Arthur of Kentucky,
did not have any doubts as to the scope of § 1: "[I]f the sheriff[s] levy an execu-
tion, execute a writ, serve a summons, or make an arrest, all acting under a sol-
emn, official oath, though as pure in duty as a saint and as immaculate as a
seraph, for a mere error of judgment, [he is liable] .... " Id. (quoted in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. at 174 n.10).
28. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond,
60 Nw. U. L. REv. 277, 277-82 (1965).
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rights granted to its citizens. 29
B. Judicial Interpretation
1. Pre-1961: Ninety Years of Dormancy
a. Limited Judicial Application of Section 1983
Despite the broad implications of section 1983, few cases were
brought under the section for nearly a century.30 A narrow read-
ing of the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities
clause,3 1 a similar reading of section 1983's jurisdictional counter-
part,32 and the Supreme Court's refusal to fully incorporate the
provisions of the Bill of Rights33 were all jointly responsible for
the dormancy of section 1983 from the time of its enactment until
1961. Additionally, and of particular importance to this examina-
tion, a primary reason for the inefficacy of section 1983 was that
courts interpreted it to require an intentional invasion of a consti-
tutional right.34
The first noticeable arousal of section 1983 involved the use of
the section to redress violations of the voting rights of Blacks.35
Dating back to 1915, the Supreme Court had upheld judgments for
Black plaintiffs against Maryland election officials who had de-
nied them the right to vote pursuant to the grandfather provision
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
30. Developments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV.
1133, 1156-69 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. Immediately following
the passage of § 1983, it was rendered ineffective by restrictive interpretations of
the fourteenth amendment recognizing traditional notions of dual federalism. See,
e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Between 1920 and 1940, § 1983 actions were largely con-
fined to discrimination and voting rights cases. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
31. See Slaughter-House Cases, supra note 30. The Court limited the scope of
the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause to privileges and
immunities of national, not state citizenship. See also Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908) (Bill of Rights not among the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship).
32. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir.
1969), cert denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1971). The jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983 is
found at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
33. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Subsequently, through se-
lective incorporation, most of the Bill of Rights has been held applicable to the
states.
34. See Landholm, The Evolution of the State ,of Mind Requirement of Section
1983, 47 TuL. L. REV. 870 (1973); Shapo, supra note 28.
35. See infra notes 36-38.
of a state statute.36 Similarly, twelve years later, the Court up-
held a damage action brought against election judges who, in
compliance with a Texas statute, refused to allow Blacks the right
to vote in a Democratic primary.37 After another twelve year in-
terval, the Court upheld the right of Blacks to sue for damages
suffered as a result of a deprivation of the right to vote under an
Oklahoma statute.38
b. The State of Mind Requirement
Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of sec-
tion 1983 contain any indication that a defendant must act with a
particular state of mind before being subject to liability under the
Act.3 9 Nevertheless, many courts focused on the purpose or mo-
tive of the defendant in determining whether a section 1983 action
existed. By 1954, one court was able to summarize the prevailing
view of section 1983's judicially formulated state of mind require-
ment.40 The court stated that a literal reading of the statute
would "reach results so bizarre and startling that the legislative
body would probably be shocked into the prompt passage of
amendatory legislation."41 The results feared by the court were
both an unnecessary intervention by federal courts into an area
traditionally left to state court remedies and a flood of trivial liti-
gation into the federal courts.42
36. Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). A grandfather clause is a provision
in a new law or regulation which exempts individuals already in or a part of an
existing system which is being regulated. Maryland's attempt at basing an indi-
vidual's voting qualifications upon the right of the citizen or his ancestors' ability
to vote at a date prior to the adoption of the fifteenth amendment was found
unconstitutional.
37. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (a state statute barring Blacks from
participation in Democratic party primary elections was held to violate the four-
teenth amendment).
38. Lane v. Wilson, 309 U.S. 268 (1939). The legislation purported to reform a
grandfather clause, yet it gave Blacks only a 12 day period in which to register.
The effect was that white people who were on the voting lists in 1914 were entitled
to vote, whereas Blacks who failed to register in the 12 day period were perma-
nently disenfranchised. The statute was held repugnant to the fifteenth amend-
ment. The original grandfather clause had been at issue in Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), involving the criminal conspiracy section of 1870 civil
rights legislation. This case was the companion case to Myers v. Anderson, supra
note 36.
39. See GLOBE, supra note 14, at 365-66, 385, 390.
40. Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954) (plaintiff alleged a depriva-
tion of his constitutional rights after he had, allegedly without notice or hearing,
been committed to a state reformatory as a delinquent. The Commissioner of Cor-
rections and the other defendants were not liable under § 1983).
41. Id. at 587.
42. Landholm, supra note 34, at 871. See also Note, Limiting the Section 1983
Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1486 (1969); Chevigny, Sec-
tion 1983 Jurisdiction A Reply, 83 HAZv. L. REv. 1352 (1970).
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Extending the state of mind requirement even further, the First
Circuit in Cobb v. City of Maiden43 indicated that liability under
section 1983 would exist only for harm intentionally inflicted
under color of official authority "which the defendants subjec-
tively realized would result in depriving the plaintiff of a right or
privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States....
The subjective factor was presumably created to limit the number
of trivial actions brought under section 1983. Consequently, it be-
came common practice for plaintiffs to allege that not only had
their constitutional rights been violated, but also that the defend-
ant had acted with a specific intent to violate those rights.45
In contrast to the quandary surrounding a number of early sec-
tion 1983 interpretations, the state of mind requirement involving
administrative denials of equal protection has been clearly formu-
lated since the decision of Snowden v. Hughes,46 and has re-
mained unchanged in this area. Snowden held that the unlawful
administration of a statute which resulted in an unequal applica-
tion of the law to a group of persons similarly situated was not a
denial of equal protection under section 1983 "unless there is
shown to be present ... an element of intentional or purposeful
discrimination .... -47
Evidently, the state of mind requirement, requiring proof of
purpose or motive, in a section 1983 action was the result of the
influence of a similar requirement for actions based on the sec-
tion's criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 242.48 To impose liability
under section 242, the government was required to establish that
the defendant had acted "willfully." Consequently, the Supreme
Court reversed a conviction under the predecessor of section 242
43. 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953).
44. Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
45. A plaintiff was forced to allege an intentional deprivation or have his ac-
tion dismissed. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
46. 321 U.S. 1 (1943). The plaintiff alleged that a refusal by the state election
board to certify the results of a state primary denied him equal protection of the
law.
47. Id. at 8.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976) provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus-
tom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro-
tected by the Constitution or laws of the United States ... shall be fined
• * * or ... subject to imprisonment.
Id. (emphasis added).
in Screws v. United States49 because the trial judge failed to in-
struct the jury to examine whether the defendant had actually in-
tended to violate the victim's constitutional rights.
With the sole exception of the voting rights area, 50 only one
early decision deviated from the intentional state of mind require-
ment. In Pickering v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 51 the Court distin-
guished section 1983 from its criminal counterpart, 52 which
contained the "willful" state of mind requirement, on the grounds
that section 1983 created civil rather than criminal liability. Ac-
cordingly, section 1983 could not be found unconstitutionally
vague simply because it did not refer to the tortfeasor's state of
mind.53 By eliminating the state of mind requirement, the court
greatly increased a plaintiff's chances of recovering for a depriva-
tion of his rights. However, as a result of the twin fears of chang-
ing the balance of federalism and the potential flood of litigation
into the already sufficiently filled docket of the federal courts,
other jurisdictions chose not to follow Pickering's lead.
The foundation was thus laid for Monroe v. Pape. 54
2. The Judicial Awakening: Monroe v. Pape
The more things change the more they remain the same. An il-
lustrative example was drawn by one commentator who com-
pared two similar incidents separated by a span of ninety years.S5
When Congress was debating the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871, Con-
gressman Niblack of Indiana read into the Congressional record a
story told by a South Carolina black man named Joshua Wardlaw.
Wardlaw stated that late one evening the white man with whom
he was -living awakened him and his family, forced them outside,
and that,
Blackwell kicked one of my little children that was in the bed. They took
my brother-in-law's gun and broke it against a tree in the yard. They laid
me down on the ground, after stripping me as naked as when I came into
the world, and struck me five times with a strap before I got away from
them. After escaping they fired four shots at me, but did not hit me. I was
so frightened I laid out in the woods all night, naked as I was, and suffered
from the exposure. Mr. Richardson afterward told me that he was very
49. 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The case involved the conviction of a Georgia sheriff for
the arrest and subseqent fatal beating of a black youth.
50. See earlier discussion in this section, supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text.
51. 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1968). See supra note 48 for the full text of the statute.
53. 151 F.2d at 249.
54. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). It is worth noting that the state of mind requirement
had not been carefully analyzed to any great extent in the pre-Monroe era. The
effects of varying degrees of negligence as sustaining a cause of action under sec-
tion 1983 were an open book yet to be authored.
55. Shapo, supra note 28, at 277-78.
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sorry that I had escaped from them. My brother-in-law died from the
beating he got .... 56
Ninety years later, an almost identical nightmare was stated in
the allegations of a complaint filed in the Federal District Court
for Northern Illinois. A black Chicago man, James Monroe, al-
leged that thirteen city policeman broke through the doors of his
apartment, woke both his wife and him with flashlights and,
forced them at gunpoint to leave their bed and stand naked in the center
of the living room.., roused the six Monroe children and herded them
into the living room ... Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times
with his flashlight, calling him "nigger" and "black boy" . . . another of-
ficer pushed Mrs. Monroe ... other officers hit and kicked several of the
children and pushed them to the floor .. .the police ransacked every
room.... Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained
on "open" charges for ten hours ... he was not advised of his procedural
rights .. .he was not permitted to call his family or an attorney .. .he
was subsequently released without criminal charges having been filed
against him.
5 7
Monroe's complaint was dismissed by the district court and the
decision was affirmed by the court of appeals. 58 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court held that James Monroe had stated a federal
cause of action.5 9 Monroe's claim for relief was allowed because
section 1983, codifying in part the legislation of 1871,60 was passed
with the intent of eliminating stories like that of Joshua Wardlaw.
The Monroe decision is significant primarily for three reasons.
First, it affirmed the view that individual actors, who carry a
badge of authority for a state and represent it in some capacity,
56. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 390 (quoting from the record of the South Caro-
lina legislative investigating committee).
57. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 203 (1961) (narrated in the dissenting opinion
by Frankfurter, J.).
58. 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959).
59. 365 U.S. 167 (as regarding the claim against the City of Chicago, the Court
held that a municipal corporation was not within the ambit of the statute). Justice
Douglas' finding of municipal immunity has been severely criticized. Courts have
diligently sought to either limit or sidestep the municipal immunity precedent.
The doctrine of municipal immunity was overruled by the Supreme Court in Mo-
nell v. Department of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (the Court
found municipalities to be within the group of "persons" to whom § 1983 applied).
See Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 144 (1972), where the author concludes that the
only policy consideration favoring the municipal immunity concept is the anachro-
nistic idea that "the king can do no wrong." See also, Adams v. City of Park Ridge,
293 F.2d 1585 (7th Cir. 1961); Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A
Comprehensive Study of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States
and the New York Court of Claims, 22 AD. L. REV. 39, 58 (1969).
60. The Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (the
Ku Klux Klan Act was also referred to as "the Third Civil Rights Act").
may be liable under the statute for the deprivation of a constitu-
tional right of another whether they act in accordance with their
authority or misuse it.61 Second, plaintiffs need not exhaust state
remedies as a prerequisite to pursuit of the federal remedy.62 Fi-
nally, the Court held that a specific intent to deprive a person of a
federal right was unnecessary to state a section 1983 claim.63
The Court found its first proposition easily supportable. Begin-
ning with a general inquiry, the Court held that Congress had the
power to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment
against persons who carry a badge of authority for a state and
represent the state in some capacity, whether acting pursuant to
that authority or acting in abuse of it.64 The Court then focused
upon the narrower issue of whether Congress, in enacting section
1983, intended to provide a remedy to parties deprived of constitu-
tional rights by an official's abuse of his position.65 The Court
concluded that Congress had intended such a remedy.66 Justice
Douglas reasoned that the Court had previously interpreted the
identical provisions in section 1983's criminal counterpart, section
242, to provide such a remedy and that the same construction
should apply equally to both statutes. 67
Justice Douglas stated what he believed to be the three pur-
poses to section 1983: to "override certain kinds of state laws," to
provide "a remedy where state law [is] inadequate," and "to pro-
vide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate
in theory, [is] not available in practice."68 He found that the pur-
pose of the statute was to provide a separate federal remedy in-
dependent of state laws:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give re-
lief. The federal remedy is supplemental to the state remedy, and the latter
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.
Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreason-
61. 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting from United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325
(1941): "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action 'taken
under color' of state law." Id.).
62. 365 U.S. at 183.
63. Id. at 187.
64. Id. at 171-72.
65. Cf. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945), United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
66. 365 U.S. at 172.
67. 365 U.S. at 185. "Thus, it is beyond doubt that this phrase should be ac-
corded the same construction in both statutes ... ." Id. Justice Douglas went on
to note that the Court was dealing with statutory interpretations, not constitu-
tional interpretations. Secondly, in examining the legislative history of the stat-
ute, not one word of criticism had appeared over the Court's previous construction
of the phrase "under color of state law." Finally, "if [the Court] states a rule un-
desirable in its consequences, Congress can change it." Id.
68. 365 U.S. at 173-74.
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able searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the federal
court.6 9
The Supreme Court clearly adopted the attitude that section 1983
was a supplemental remedy. Such a determination is consistent
with the spirit and purpose surrounding both the birth and evolu-
tion of the statute.
It was the Court's third proposition which created the most con-
troversy. Justice Douglas read section 1983 literally and asserted:
"Section 1979 [42 U.S.C. § 1983] should be read against the back-
ground of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natu-
ral consequences of his actions. ' 70 Applying tort concepts to the
facts in Monroe would probably result in a finding that the Chi-
cago police officers had committed the intentional torts of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress, and invasion of privacy.7 ' To what extent section 1983 ac-
tions should apply the "background of tort liability" remains
uncertain. However, it appears that the decision of Monroe in-
tended to abolish, at least in some instances, the specific intent
requirement. Liability, therefore, appears to depend partially
upon the consequences of the act, rather than simply upon the
state of mind of the actor.72
69. 365 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added). Respondents had argued that Illinois
provided an ample remedy for petitioner's claim. The breaking into petitioner's
apartment violated the Constitution and laws of Illinois. It was pointed out that
state law provided a simple remedy for the violation and that full redress could
have been obtained under the common law. The Court stated that no "statute, or-
dinance, regulation, custom or usage" of Illinois had barred that redress. 365 U.S.
at 172.
70. 365 U.S. at 187. Even Justice Frankfurter's dissent was in accord with the
majority's position regarding a possible state of mind requisite. Id. at 207 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
71. See Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND.
L. J. 5, 6 (1974). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 18, 35 (1965).
72. The literal reading of § 1983, along with the references to tort liability, sup-
ports the conclusion that the determining factor in a § 1983 action is whether the
act results in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Kirkpatrick, Defining A
Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The State of Mind Requirement, 40 CIN. L
REV. 45 (1977). See also Bristow, Section 1983: An Analysis and Suggested Ap-
proach, 29 ARK. L. REV. 255 (1975). "[Tlhe real focus becomes whether or not a
plaintiff's federal rights have been violated, not whether the violation was caused
by an act or a failure to act. Judicial differentiation between intent and negligence
in regard to such causation is meaningless obfuscation." Id. at 318.
4. The Progeny of Monroe v. Pape
a. A Lack of Uniformity Among the Federal Courts
Monroe's declaration that a specific state of mind was not re-
quired to maintain a successful 1983 action - thereby expanding
the scope of the section in the direction of common law tort prin-
ciples - was not uniformly adopted by the lower federal courts.
The lower courts' approach varied from a narrow pre-Monroe spe-
cific intent requirement, to a middle ground of tort-based fault
analysis, and possibly as far as strict liability.73 McCray v. Mary-
land74 was one of the few cases which upheld a section 1983 ac-
tion based on negligent conduct.7 5 The plaintiff alleged that the
Clerk of the Baltimore City Court had negligently impeded the
filing of his petition for state post-conviction relief. The district
court dismissed the complaint and the court of appeals reversed,
holdiig that the plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the
courts had been violated and that his complaint, therefore, stated
a negligence claim actionable under section 1983.76
73. One author noted the ambiguity of Justice Douglas' language in Monroe:
The phrase "background of tort liability" and "responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions" can be read to refer to different concepts
within the law of torts. On one hand, "responsible for the natural conse-
quences of his actions" would appear to refer to a standard of strict
liability.
Landholm, supra note 34, at 875. On the other hand, the language may also be in-
terpreted as suggesting that the state of mind of the actor is irrelevant. Id.
74. 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974).
75. See Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972) (the court characterized the
defendant police officer's conduct as a breach of a duty through inaction and
therefore such inaction constituted negligence). While intentional torts ordinarily
require affirmative conduct, occasionally an intentional failure to act serves as the
basis for liability for an intentional tort.
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S.
418 (1972) (argued in dictum that the superiors of a police officer were negligent in
not properly training and controlling the officer). For articles pertaining to judicial
treatment of § 1983 actions, see Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Fed-
eral Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 355 (1978); Judicial En-
forcement of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REV. 1 (1974); Nahmod, supra
note 71; Shapo, supra note 28; Note, supra note 42.
76. 456 F.2d at 5-6. The court relied upon three decisions for the proposition
that a § 1983 action may be based on negligence: Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418 (1972) (liability for negligent
supervision and training of a police officer); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th
Cir. 1970) (police officer's reckless use of force); and Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969) (plaintiff's continued imprisonment for
nine months after the dismissal of his indictment due to a communication break-
down). However, Averett involved gross negligence, as opposed to ordinary negli-
gence; and Whirl involved a false imprisonment.
On the other hand, in Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978), the court concluded that no "constitutional tort"
had been alleged by plaintiff's claim that the negligence of prison guards resulted
in the loss of plaintiff's property. 545 F.2d at 567. The court first held that the neg-
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In Whirl v. Kern, 77 a communication failure between a clerk's
office and a sheriffs office caused the plaintiff to remain in jail for
nearly nine months after his indictment had been dismissed. The
sheriff was not found to have acted out of improper motives, and,
furthermore, the jury found that he had not even been negligent.
The court recounted Justice Douglas' belief that the section 1983
remedy was available when the constitutional deprivations
stemmed from "prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance ... or
otherwise,"7 8 and concluded that "[s] uch language suggests that a
federal forum is no less desirable for the inadvertent than for the
malicious violation of constitutionally protected rights."79 Al-
though not expressly stating that strict liability was a viable ap-
proach to establishing liability under section 1983, Whirl implied
that there was no state of mind prerequisite. 80
Even after the Monroe decision, aiming toward either a tort or
strict liability approach to section 1983 actions, some federal
courts continued to cling to versions of the intent requirement. In
Beauregard v. Wingard, 81 the court held that although specific in-
tent was no longer a prerequisite to liability where police action
was involved, "'motive' should and does bear heavily in cases
under section 1983. .... "82 Other federal courts have also refused
to apply the tort liability concept to section 1983 actions.83
b. The Retreat of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, fearing that a literal reading of Monroe
ligent loss was not a deprivation of property without due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment. The court then proceeded to conclude that the negligent
conduct of the guards was not an action "under color of state law." Therefore, no
cause of action under § 1983 had been alleged. Id.
77. 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
78. Other federal courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Crumlish, 224 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1963), where the court noted that "[tIhe
Supreme Court has made 'neglect' a ground for bringing a federally derived claim
as well as 'prejudice,' 'passion,' and 'intolerance.'" Id.
79. 407 F.2d at 788.
80. Id. First, Whirl held that the district court had erred in allowing the negli-
gence issue to be considered by the jury. 407 F.2d at 793. Secondly, the court
noted that the facts of the case illustrated a deprivation of constitutional rights ca-
pable of occurring even in the absence of malice or negligence. Id. at 788 n.7.
81. 230 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
82. Id. at 183.
83. Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1963) (limiting liability to
cases involving at least "reprehensible action on the part of the defendant."). See
Tyree v. Smith, 289 F. Supp. 174, 176 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); Bargainer v. Michal, 233 F.
Supp. 270 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
would lead to a "font of tort law,"8 4 began to search for its own
methods of limiting the scope of section 1983. Only a year after
the decision, the Court held that Monroe had not changed the re-
quirement of purposeful discrimination as a prerequisite for es-
tablishing an equal protection deprivation.8 5 Thirteen years later,
the Court managed to curtail section 1983's scope by limiting the
interests protectable under the Constitution. In Paul v. DaviS, 86
the Court concluded that a personal reputation was not a consti-
tutionally protected interest. Justice Rehnquist's opinion indi-
cated a fear of creating general federal tort law.8 7 Thus, by
limiting the scope of section 1983, the Court attempted to avoid
federal displacement of state authority.88
In Wood v. Strickland, 89 the Court held that a good faith immu-
nity precluded liability under section 1983. The plaintiffs had al-
leged that their due process rights had been violated when they
were expelled from school.90 Relying upon common law and pol-
icy considerations, the Court extended a qualified immunity to
good faith actions undertaken by school officials in fulfilling their
official duties.9 1 The immunity, however, was not absolute. Lia-
biity would be imposed if the actor knew or reasonably should
have known that his actions would violate a constitutional right.92
84. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1975).
85. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). The precedent of Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U.S. 1 (1944), was upheld. Oyler made it quite clear that an equal protection
deprivation required a showing of deliberate discrimination.
86. 424 U.S. 693 (1975). Paul involved an action where police officials distrib-
uted a flyer containing photographs of persons described as "active shoplifters."
Davis was charged with shoplifting, but was never convicted. The flyer was dis-
tributed to approximately 800 local merchants and Davis alleged that the listing of
his name and inclusion of his photograph on the flyer had inhibited him from en-
tering these establishments and had damaged his employment opportunities. He
subsequently brought a § 1983 action alleging a deprivation of his liberty without
due process of law. Id. at 696-97.
87. Id. at 698-99.
88. 424 U.S. at 698-701. Paul is one of the most heavily criticized decisions in a
number of years. Justice Rehnquist was forced to cope with a number of decisions
to reach his conclusion; most notably, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971) (posting the names of excessive drinkers in public). Justice Rehnquist dis-
tinguished the Constantineau case on the grounds that the petitioner was actually
deprived of the previously granted right to purchase liquor. Such a distinction can
hardly be taken seriously. There is no indication anywhere in the opinion that the
loss of the ability to purchase liquor had anything to do with the result. Rather,
the Court had chosen to focus upon the damage to the petitioner's reputation, not-
ing that: "[Clertainly where the State attaches a 'badge of infamy' to the citizen,
due process comes into play.... ." 400 U.S. at 437. The only possible distinction is
the difference between the type of stigma imposed, i.e., a morally reprehensible
drunk as opposed to a common thief.
89. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
90. Id. at 309-10.
91. Id. at 318.
92. 420 U.S. at 322.
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Continuing to limit the scope of section 1983, the Court, in Es-
telle v. Gamble, 93 held that the negligent failure to provide ade-
quate medical care for a prisoner was insufficient to establish a
section 1983 cause of action for a violation of the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.94 The Court
stated that since intent was a necessary prerequisite of an eighth
amendment violation, a section 1983 suit based upon the amend-
ment required a showing of some form of intent, or at least delib-
erate indifference.95
In Ingraham v. Wright, 96 an action involving disciplinary corpo-
ral punishment, the Court changed its field of fire by focusing on
the nature of the constitutional right infringed. Thus, a de
minimis level of inquiry had to be hurdled before a constitutional
issue was ever raised.97 In its two-step analysis, the Court con-
cluded that the nature of the interest had to be examined first.98
If a constitutionally protectible interest were found, the inquiry
would then shift to a determination of whether the due process
protections of section 1983 had been satisfied. Under this analy-
sis, the Court concluded that the corporal punishment inflicted by
school officials upon the plaintiff was insufficient to state an ac-
tionable section 1983 claim.99
In Baker v. McCollan, 10 0 the Court granted certiorari specifi-
cally for the purpose of determining whether negligence was suffi-
cient to establish a section 1983 action.101 The Court
93. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
94. Id. at 105.
95. Id. at 105-06. "[Aln inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care
cannot be said to constitute 'an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or to be
'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Id.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens chose to take an arguably more realistic approach
to the instant problem: "Subjective motivation may well determine what, if any,
remedy is appropriate against a particular defendant. However, whether the con-
stitutional standard has been violated should turn on the character of the punish-
ment rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted it." 479 U.S. at 116
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. 430 U.S. 651 (1977); see infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
97. 430 U.S. at 674.
98. Id. at 672.
99. Id. at 676.
100. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
101. This question had previously been before the Court in Procunier v. Nava-
rette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (a state prisoner brought an action against prison officials
alleging, inter alia, a negligent interference with his outgoing mail in violation of
his constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment. The action was re-
solved on the basis of the prison officials, qualified immunity from damages under
subsequently avoided the negligence issue and decided the case
on the grounds that the respondent had not suffered a deprivation
of a constitutional right.102 However, the Court did address the
negligence issue in dicta.' 03 The Court noted that the requisite
intent requirement would vary depending upon the particular
constitutional interest allegedly violated.104
As a final prelude to Parratt, the Supreme Court placed a nar-
row construction on the word "deprived," within the meaning of
that word as contained in the due process clause and section 1983.
In Martinez v. California, O5 the parents of a fifteen-year-old girl,
murdered by a recently paroled inmate, brought an action against
the state officials responsible for the parole decision. 06 They
based their action on two theories. First, that the granting of ab-
solute immunity to the state officers who had made the parole de-
cision deprived their daughter of her life without due process
because it left the parents without a cause of action against the
state officials.' 07 Second, that the action of the parole officers also
provided a cause of action under section 1983, which provided an
additional remedy.08
The Supreme Court held that the state statute granting abso-
lute immunity was constitutional because the girl had not been
"deprived" of her life within the framework of the due process
clause and section 1983.109 Justice Stevens' opinion stated that
the death of the girl was simply "too remote a consequence of the
parole officers' action" to have violated the due process clause." 0
Again, as in Monroe, the Court apparently had shifted its inquiry
to tort law concepts. However, the definition of "deprived" was
limited by the tort concepts of "proximate cause""' and "foresee-
ability."112 The Court apparently intended that liability should
not be extended to consequences which are simply too remote.
§ 1983). The Court failed to address the negligence issue and dismissed the claim
for failure to state a constitutional violation. Id. at 565.
102. 443 U.S. at 146-47. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to state an actionable claim
under § 1983. Id.
103. Id. at 139-40.
104. Id.
105. 444 U.S. 277 (1980). For an analysis of the decision, see Terrell, "Property,"
"Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analy-
sis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861, 918-23 (1982).
106. 444 U.S. at 279-80.
107. Id. at 280-81.
108. Id. at 279, 280-81, 283.
109. Id. at 281, 283.
110. Id. at 285.
111. Proximate cause itself is an extremely complex concept. See generally W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-56, 236-90 (4th ed. 1971).
112. Foreseeability is also a nebulous concept. Generally, the concept entails
the ability to see or know in advance. The reasonable anticipation is that harm or
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III. PARRATr V. TAYLOR
The Court granted certiorari for the express purpose of deter-
mining whether negligent conduct would be sufficient to sustain a
claim for relief under section 1983.113 Specifically, the Court in-
tended to eliminate the confusion existing in the lower federal
courts by providing a workable standard for section 1983 claims.114
In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist perfunctorily stated
that neither the statutory language of section 1983 nor the legisla-
tive history of the Civil Rights Act required any form of intent in
order to sustain a section 1983 cause of action.115 Therefore, a neg-
ligence-based cause of action could be asserted under section
1983.116
The Court next examined whether the respondent had suffered
a deprivation of property without due process of law. With little
difficulty, the Court concluded that the respondent's hobby kit
was in fact "property" and that the negligent loss of that property
by prison officials constituted a deprivation.1 7 The final inquiry
shifted to the issue that became the nucleus of the opinion:
whether the deprivation of respondent's property was without
due process of law.118 The Court found the essence of due pro-
cess to be an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time.119
injury is a likely result of acts or omissions. Emery v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 494, 148
S.W.2d 479 (1941). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965).
113. 451 U.S. at 532-34.
114. Id. at 533-34. "We, therefore, once more put our shoulder to the wheel hop-
ing to be of greater assistance to courts confronting such a fact situation than it
appears we have been in the past." Id.
115. Id. at 532-35. "Both Baker... and Monroe ... suggest that §1983 affords a
'civil remedy' for deprivations of federally protected rights caused by persons act-
ing under color of state law without any express requirement of a particular state
of mind." Id. at 535. The Baker Court actually found that whether negligence was
sufficient to state a § 1983 claim was not susceptible to a single answer, but would
depend upon the particular constitutional right allegedly deprived. 443 U.S. at 139-
40.
116. 451 U.S. at 535.
117. Id. at 536-37. The Court stated the two essential elements of a § 1983 action
to be: "(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting
under color of state law; and (2) whether the conduct deprived a person of his
rights, privileges, or immumities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States." 451 U.S. at 535.
118. 451 U.S. at 535-43. The three requirements of a due process claim had been
alleged by the respondent: 1.) the prison officials had acted under color of state
law; 2.) the hobby kit satisfied the constitutional definition of property; and 3.) the
negligent loss of respondent's property constituted a deprivation. Id. at 536-37.
119. 451 U.S. at 540 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
The availability of a state tort remedy to redress the respondent's
claim was considered an adequate means of fulfilling the due pro-
cess requirements.120 Accordingly, the Court held that respon-
dent had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983.121
Five justices were dissatisfied with some aspect of the majority
opinion. Justices Stewart and Powell believed that intentional be-
havior was a necessary prerequisite to a due process violation.122
Therefore, the mere negligent loss of respondent's property did
not amount to a deprivation within the context of the fourteenth
amendment. 2 3 Justice Blackmun, followed by Justice White, ex-
pressed his belief that the majority's holding that state tort reme-
dies were sufficient to satisfy due process should not be extended
beyond actions other than negligent deprivations of property.124
Apparently, such an approach would be inappropriate for a situa-
tion involving an intentional deprivation under Justice Black-
mun's reasoning. Finally, Justice Marshall expressed the view
that negligence was sufficient to state a section 1983 violation; a
state remedy may preclude a finding of a violation of the four-
teenth amendment; but because the state prison officials had not
informed respondent of his rights under state law the state rem-
edy was itself inadequate. 2 5
IV. ANALYSIS OF PARRATT
A. Whether a Section 1983 Complaint Framed in Terms of
Negligence States a Cause of Action
One aspect of Justice Rehnquist's treatment of the negligence
issue is immediately apparent. It is surprisingly brief. In five
paragraphs he disposes of the "legion" of conflicting views of vari-
120. 451 U.S. at 543-44. This reasoning appears to have been borrowed from
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565
(1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (the court held that the existence of ade-
quate state procedures to redress a property loss caused by state officials pre-
cluded a finding of a due process violation).
121. 451 U.S. at 543.
122. Id. at 544-45 (Stewart, J., concurring) and id. at 545-554 (Powell, J., con-
curring).
123. Justice Stewart stated: "It seems to me extremely doubtful that the prop-
erty loss here, even though presumably caused by the negligence of state agents,
is the kind of deprivation of property to which the Fourteenth Amendment is ad-
dressed." 451 U.S. at 544 (Stewart, J., concurring).
124. 451 U.S. at 545-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring). "The mere availability of a
subsequent tort remedy before tribunals of the same authority that, through its
employees, deliberately inflicted the harm complained of, might well not provide
the due process of which the Fourteenth Amendment speaks." Id. at 546.
125. 451 U.S. at 554-56 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Marshall would impose an affirmative obligation on the part of prison offi-
cials to inform a prisoner of the state remedies available to him.
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ous courts to announce that, in contrast to its criminal counter-
part,126 section 1983 does not require intentional conduct or any
other particular state of mind as a prerequisite to recovery.127 Ac-
cordingly, all that is required by the statute is: (1) conduct "com-
mitted by a person acting under color of state law [that has] . . .
(2) deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States."128
Although conceivably not a quantum leap, the shift from Justice
Douglas' statement that section 1983 "should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions"129 to Justice Rehnquist's
view that "[u]nquestionably, respondent's claim satisfies three
prerequisites of a valid due process claim . . . and the alleged
loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a depriva-
tion"130 certainly deserves more than token analysis.131 The Court
based its opinion on a narrow interpretation of a few cases while
simply ignoring other relevant authority.
The opinion of Justice Rehnquist relies primarily upon two
cases, Monroe and Baker. However, Monroe's tort law analysis132
does not express the view that negligence would be a sufficient
prerequisite for a section 1983 action in all cases. On the contrary,
Monroe's tort-based analysis suggests that the specific nature of
the wrong is the basis for determining the culpable standard of
conduct. 3 3 Additionally, Baker, which involved due process,
stated in dicta that the state of mind of the defendant may be a
relevant factor in determining whether a constitutional violation
126. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
127. 451 U.S. at 532-35.
128. Id. at 535.
129. 365 U.S. at 187.
130. 451 U.S. at 536-37.
131. The state of mind requirement for a § 1983 action has been one of the most
perplexing problems facing the district courts in the last twenty years. To provide
significant guidance, the analysis of the Supreme Court requires more than a pass-
ing explanation. For a critical analysis of Justice Rehnquist's opinions in due pro-
cess cases see Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 293 (1976).
132. 365 U.S. at 180. The Court interpreted the legislative history of § 1983 as
evidencing an intent to provide a federal remedy for a state deprivation of a fed-
eral right "by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise." Id.
At least one commentator supports the position that this language eliminates the
state of mind requirement under § 1983. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 72.
133. 365 U.S. at 187.
had occurred. 34 Accordingly, neither case directly supports the
conclusion that a negligent action is sufficient to support a cogni-
zable constitutional violation. 3 5
The lack of analysis is further evidenced by the failure to recog-
nize and distinguish recent decisions which expressly required a
finding of intent as a necessary prerequisite to a constitutional vi-
olation. In Estelle v. Gamble, 136 the Court held that a mere negli-
gent failure to provide adequate medical care for a prisoner was
insufficient to establish a section 1983 claim. 37 Consistent with
Monroe and Baker, Estelle focused on the constitutional right al-
legedly infringed to determine the proper state of mind standard
sufficient to constitute a constitutional deprivation.138 In Parratt,
apparently relying on Monroe and Baker, the Court rejected this
line of analysis.
The conclusion that negligence can be a basis for a section 1983
action139 is not particularly troublesome. The state of mind re-
quirement is a child of judicial nativity. Neither the legislative
history nor the language of the statute itself requires any form of
intent as a prerequisite for a statutory violation.140 Nonetheless,
one cannot escape the feeling that some form of judicial sleight of
hand is occurring in Parratt. Why would the Supreme Court, an
institution historically unfriendly toward section 1983 actions,141
134. 443 U.S. at 140 n.1.
135. Justice Powell's concurrence in Parratt reiterates the position that the ac-
tor's state of mind is of importance in determining whether a constitutional viola-
tion has occurred. "In my view, this question requires the Court to determine
whether intent is an essential element ofa due process claim, just as we have done
in cases applying the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition of 'cruel and unusual punishment.'" 451 U.S. at 547 (Powell, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
For further comment on this matter, see Guild, Civil Rights: The Supreme Court
Finds New Ways to Limit Section 1983, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 776 (1981).
136. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). "[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care cannot be said to constitute 'an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or
to be 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'!' Id. at 105-06. The Court required
a deliberate indifference to be present in order to constitute an eighth amendment
violation.
137. 429 U.S. at 105-06.
138. Because certain constitutional violations require a specified state of mind
requirement, it is logical to require § 1983 actions to parallel the separate constitu-
tional intent requirements.
139. 451 U.S. at 544.
140. See supra notes 5, 69-72 and accompanying text.
141. This line of analysis is inconsistent with the Court's recent decisions limit-
ing the scope of § 1983 in a constant retreat from Monroe. A primary concern of
the federal courts is the ever increasing caseload. One author has noted that be-
tween 1871 and 1939, only 19 § 1983 cases were reported. In 1960 there were 280
cases filed, 3,586 in 1970, and nearly 8,000 in 1973. Note, Section 1983 and Federal-
ism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 904, 915 (1976). The au-
thor also states that federalism is a primary concern in the proliferation of § 1983
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provide a negligence standard which would appear to greatly en-
large the scope of section 1983 actions? The answer may well be
in the Court's unexpressed motivations. In addition to broaden-
ing the potential scope of section 1983, the Court simultaneously
held that where an adequate state remedy exists, the require-
ments of due process are satisfied.142 Therefore, because tort
remedies traditionally encompass negligently inflicted harm, the
Court has effectively demoted a constitutional deprivation to a
simple violation of state tort law.143
B. The Need for a Supplemental Remedy
1. The Doctrine of Exhaustion
Until recently, it had been considered well settled law that a
plaintiff was able to maintain a section 1983 action in federal court
without regard to the possible availability of adequate state reme-
dies.144 Monroe clearly established the principle that a party
seeking redress for a constitutional violation need not exhaust
state tort remedies as a prerequisite to maintaining a claim in fed-
eral court.' 45 However, the no-exhaustion rule became the sub-
ject of critical attack. Criticism was particularly severe in the
context of administrative remedies. 46 Judge Friendly, for exam-
ple, urged that exhaustion of state administrative remedies
should be a precondition to access to the federal courts. 47 The
theory behind exhaustion is judicial economy; requiring adminis-
actions. Actions involving state officials and state policies are being displaced by
the federal courts, leading to an unnecessary burden of the federal caseload.
142. 451 U.S. at 544.
143. See Guild, supra note 135.
144. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See, e.g., Chevigny, Section 1983 Juris-
diction: A Reply, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1352 (1970); Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies
Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1968); Note, The Federal In-
junction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1969).
145. In Monroe, Justice Douglas stated that: "It is no answer that the State has
a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to
the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked." 365 U.S. at 183.
146. The Second Circuit, for example, consistently resisted excluding § 1983
cases from an administrative exhaustion requirement. See Plano v. Baker, 504
F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1974); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973)
147. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 100-01 (1973);
see also Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. OR-
DER 557, 575-78 (1973).
trative agencies to first attempt to resolve the conflict.148 Addition-
ally, there is a salient interest in permitting the states to design
and administer state remedies concerning state actions.149
Although not expressly overruling the no-exhaustion precedent,
the Supreme Court began to escalate the importance of available
state remedies in Paul v. Davis 150 and Ingraham v. Wright. 1 In
Paul, the scope of section 1983's jurisdictional authority was cur-
tailed.52 The rhetoric of Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion fo-
cused on the availability of a state tort remedy which could have
provided a parallel remedy to the plaintiff's section 1983 claim. 53
In Ingraham, the Court advanced even further toward over-
turning the no-exhaustion doctrine. The Court rejected a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a state statute authorizing disci-
plinary corporal punishment. 54 Justice Powell's majority opinion
repeatedly relied upon the common law background surrounding
the use of reasonable corporal punishment. Again, the opinion re-
ferred to the existence of adequate common law concepts in dis-
posing with the plaintiffs due process allegations.95 Although the
Court found corporal punishment to be an interest protected by
the "liberty" safeguard of the fourteenth amendment, it neverthe-
less found the state common law remedies to afford adequate due
process protections.1S6
148. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) ("the basic purpose of the ex-
haustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within
its special competence." Id.); J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 153 (1938).
149. See Developments, supra note 30, at 1179-83.
150. 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see supra note 86.
151. 430 U.S. 651 (1977); see infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
153. Justice Rehnquist noted that it appeared the plaintiff had stated "a classi-
cal claim for defamation" which could have been brought in state court. 424 U.S.
at 697 (notice that Justice Rehnquist has changed the word could, as in Paul, to
must, in Parratt). Fearing further expansion of § 1983, Justice Rehnquist stated
that providing a federal remedy for such an invasion would "almost necessarily"
convert any tort committed by a state official under color of state law, into a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. 424 U.S. at 699. See generally Shapiro, supra
note 131, at 324-28.
154. 430 U.S. at 674. The Court held that there existed a mere de minimis de-
gree of infringement upon the constitutionally protected liberty interest to be free
from physical punishment with which the Court is not concerned. The corporal
punishment inflicted upon the school children in this situation was determined
not to surpass that level. Id.
155. The Court found that a role was played by "[tiraditional concepts" con-
cerning allegations of cruel and unusual punishment. 430 U.S. at 659 (citing Pow-
ell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968)).
156. 430 U.S. at 670.
The openness of the public school and its supervision by the community
afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which the
Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner. In virtually every community
where corporal punishment is permitted in the schools, these safeguards
are reinforced by the legal constraints of the common law.
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In light of the ever burgeoning federal docket and the availabil-
ity of adequate state tort remedies, a logical inquiry would be
whether there is a valid justification for burdening the federal
courts with section 1983 actions. Justice Harlan, in his concurring
opinion in Monroe, suggests a justification for providing a "sup-
plementary" remedy under section 1983.157 Quite simply, the fed-
eral remedy is provided because the interest asserted by the
plaintiff is important enough to warrant protection by the federal
Constitution.158 When the state remedy is "fully appropriate to
redress those injuries ... against which the Constitution pro-
vides protection," it is simply a matter of "the purest
coincidence."1 59
Reduced to its simplest form, the argument is that the federal
courts are the most appropriate forum to redress the violation of
federal rights. 160 As noted by one commentator, the open federal
door symbolizes the importance of those rights.161 Beyond theo-
retical justification, an obvious reason for providing a federal judi-
ciary for section 1983 actions exists because Congress has
mandated the federal forum. The federal government created the
Constitution, the Congress enacted section 1983, and the federal
courts were intended to construe the implications of the statute.
Since the federal government has chosen to impose these rights
and remedies, that same government should bear the cost of their
enforcement. Although arguments calling for judicial economy
are appealing,162 they become irrelevant in light of the protections
granted by the Constitution and section 1983-and the corre-
sponding choice to bear the costs of protecting these interests.
Accordingly, fiscal judicial concerns are inadequate justifications
for releasing this protection to state courts.
Id.
157. See 365 U.S. at 196. Through the federal courts, the federal government is
able to participate in the process of defining these core values.
158. Id.
159. 365 U.S. at 196 n.5.
160. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 147, at 90.
161. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 22 (1980).
162. One of Chief Justice Burger's major concerns is the state of affairs in the
federal courts: the bench is understaffed, overworked, and the situation is consist-
ently growing worse. See, e.g., Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judici-
ary, 66 A.B.A. J. 295, 297 (1980); Burger, Chief Justice's Yearend Report, 1977, 64
A.B.A. J. 211 (1978); Burger, Chief Justice Burger's 1977 Report to the American Bar
Association, 63 A.B.A. J. 504 (1977); Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. - A Need for Sys-
tematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976).
Additional considerations dictate the need for a supplemental
remedy. In the case of uncertain state law, the plaintiff may be
compelled to first bring the state action to clarify the state rem-
edy. 163 If unsuccessful, his costs would be duplicated by subse-
quent federal litigation. Where a state remedy existed, the
plaintiff would have to resort to that forum initially. At best, he
may only be forced to duplicate his costs by subsequently resort-
ing to a federal forum if unsuccessful in state court.164 On the
other hand, based upon principles of comity and the growing need
for judicial economy, he could be barred from relitigating his
claim in a federal forum under the doctrines of res judicata1 65
As noted by Justice Douglas, one of the primary purposes of
section 1983 was that "it provided a remedy when state law was
inadequate."166 The inadequacy of state law was one of respon-
dent's primary contentions in Parratt. Four deficiencies were
noted. 67 First, the state remedy provided only for an action
against the state, and not individual defendants.168 Second, the
state remedy did not allow for punitive damages.169 Third, the
state remedy did not grant the right to a jury trial.170 Finally, the
existence of a cause of action was dependent both upon underly-
ing state tort law and upon specific statutory exclusions.'71 The
Court rejected respondent's contentions holding that, although he
may have been denied relief which would have been available
under section 1983, the limited state remedies were sufficient to
"satisfy the requirements of due process."172
The Court laid to rest the no-exhaustion doctrine. In doing so,
the Court overruled Monroe, relying only on limited dicta in
Paul7 3 to justify its conclusion, and still had the confidence to
163. See Developments, supra note 30, at 1254-57. See generally Developments,
supra note 30, at 1164-74.
164. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964) (allowing a procedure for reserving federal claims for federal court determi-
nation in abstention cases).
165. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). The Court held that the decision of a
state court on a federal constitutional claim raised in a state criminal proceeding
was assertable as a collateral estoppel defense to a subsequent action for damages
under a § 1983 action. Id. This result seems to be another device to narrow the
scope of § 1983 actions.
166. 365 U.S. at 173.
167. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 25-26, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981).
168. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,215, 81-8,223 (Reissue 1976).
169. Id.
170. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,214 (Reissue 1976).
171. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,215 (Reissue 1976).
172. 451 U.S. 543-44.
173. 451 U.S. at 544. "Such reasoning 'would make of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already
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state that "[o] ur decision today is fully consistent with our prior
cases."'174 The Court has apparently shifted the responsibility of
formulating the rights and remedies provided by the federal Con-
stitution and a federal statute to the state courts.
2. The Examination of Due Process
Having found that the officials had acted under color of state
law,175 the Court proceeded to examine whether respondent had
suffered a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Unquestionably respondent's hobby kit satisfied the definition of
property.1 7 6 Additionally, as previously discussed, even a negli-
gent loss of property constituted a deprivation.177 Therefore, the
definitive issue became that of due process. 78 Justice Rehnquist
found that the availability of state tort remedies satisfied due
process. 179
The Court initially examined situations where a pre-deprivation
hearing was required prior to state interference with a liberty or
property interest. The Court determined that pre-deprivation
hearings were required to satisfy due process only where the
deprivations were a result of an established state procedure.18o
The Court proceeded to examine cases where a post-deprivation
remedy was found to have satisfied the requirements of due pro-
cess. The Court stated that, in cases involving inadvertent depri-
vations of property, as long as an adequate opportunity for a
judicial inquiry was ultimately available, the mere postponement
be administered by the States.'" Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701
(1976)).
174. 451 U.S. at 544.
175. Id. at 535-36. "[IIt can no longer be questioned that the alleged conduct by
the petitioners in this case satisfies the 'under color of state law' requirement.
Petitioners were, after all, state employees in positions of considerable authority."
Id.
176. 451 U.S. at 536.
177. Id. at 536-37.
178. "Nothing in [the Fourteenth] Amendment protects against all deprivations
of life, liberty, or property by the State. The Fourteenth Amendment protects only
against deprivations 'without due process of law.'" 451 U.S. at 537.
179. Having found the state remedy to provide adequate constitutional protec-
tion, Justice Rehnquist held that "the respondent [has] not alleged a violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 451 U.S. at 543.
180. In these situations, due process was held to require a pre-deprivation hear-
ing because the deprivation was authorized by an established state procedure. 451
U.S. at 537-38. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
of that inquiry did not violate due process. 181 Consequently, even
though the original acts of the state employees may have
amounted to a constitutional deprivation, the availability of a tort
remedy in Nebraska precluded a finding of a due process viola-
tion-Taylor had merely been deprived of his property, not due
process.182
This conclusion is beyond a procedural determination. The
Court is not merely holding that state remedies must first be ex-
hausted before a plaintiff can file a section 1983 action. Rather,
Justice Rehnquist made a substantive decision that because a
post-deprivation state remedy was available, the prison officials'
misconduct did not violate the fourteenth amendment.183 The
analysis is troubling. Presumably, if the state fails to provide an
adequate tort remedy, the constitutional deprivation would be the
work of the state, and not of the original wrongdoers-who should
not be the ones held liable for a failure of the state to enact ap-
propriate legislation.184
Elaborating on his analytical process, Justice Rehnquist subse-
quently made a curious remark about the nature of due process
itself: "[a]Ilthough [respondent] has been deprived of property
under color of state law, the deprivation did not occur as a result
of some established state procedure. Indeed, the deprivation oc-
curred as a result of the unauthorized failure of agents of the
state to follow established State procedure."185 The statement
would appear to imply that various degrees of due process ex-
181. The Court found in certain cases that either the necessity for immediate
action by the state or the impracticality of providing a meaningful pre-deprivation
process can, when coupled with a subsequent inquiry into the propriety of the
state's action, satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. 451 U.S. at 539.
See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 606 (1974).
182. 451 U.S. at 537-44. Consequently, the respondent's § 1983 claim was un-
founded. Id. at 544.
183. See Kirby, Demoting 14th Amendment Claims to State Torts, 68 A.B.A. J.
167, 167-71 (1982).
184. The problem with this analysis was pointed out in Kent v. Prasse, 385 F.2d
406 (3rd Cir. 1967). The court faced an identical claim of a deprivation of proce-
dural due process by prison officials because the state failed to provide a remedy
for official negligence. The court stated that "[in any event, such a deprivation
would be the work of the state, not these defendants." 385 F.2d at 407. This di-
lemma was noted by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Parratt. See Ten-
ney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (immunity for legislators); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (the eleventh amendment bars suits against the states
in federal court).
185. 451 U.S. at 543. Justice Rehnquist assumes that the due process clause and
section 1983 are virtually co-extensive and interchangeable. However, upon exami-
nation of the legislative history of § 1983, it would appear that Congress intended
more than a mere codification of the fourteenth amendment. See notes 13-38 and
accompanying text.
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ist:186 a sliding scale of due process.187 Justice Rehnquist notes
the difference between an occasional deviation and an ongoing,
repetitive state action, the former being a lesser degree of depri-
vation requiring a correspondingly lesser form of due process to
satisfy constitutional protections. Under such an analysis the
state tort remedies were found sufficient to satisfy this limited in-
vasion of the respondent's due process.188
The Court stated that "[t]he fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard and it is an 'opportunity
which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.' "189 Thereafter, the presence of a state remedy is found
to satisfy these requirements.190 A question worth begging is, can
a state statute, unnoticed by a federal district judge and his
clerks, the staff of the state attorney general's office, the staff of
the Nebraska Correctional Complex, private counsel, and the
judges and clerks of the court of appeals be considered as grant-
ing respondent an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner" after five years of litigation seeking
the return of $23.50?191
186. See Terrell, supra note 105, at 924-26.
187. Justice Marshall is the strongest advocate of a sliding scale approach to
due process. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
188. 451 U.S. at 543-44. "The remedies provided could have fully compensated
the respondent for the property loss he suffered, and we hold that they are suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of due process." Id. at 544.
Perhaps what is most disturbing is that the opinion appears to be equally appli-
cable to intentional as well as negligent misconduct. The Court's analysis refers to
cases "such as the present one which allege facts that are commonly thought to
state a claim for a common law tort normally dealt with by state courts. . . ." 451
U.S. at 533. Common law torts encompass intentional as well as negligent acts.
Additionally, the Court noted that the deprivation was not pursuant to established
state procedures, but rather involved an unauthorized failure to adhere to stan-
dards. Such a deviation could not have been practically restricted in advance;
therefore, it only required post-deprivation remedies. 451 U.S. 537-44. This situa-
tion could apply equally to unauthorized intentional or negligent actions.
The possible application of Parratt to intentional acts draws additional support
from the recent Supreme Court decision in Ingraham which also involved inten-
tional acts. The analysis of both cases would indicate that due process may be sat-
isfied by state common law remedies even when constitutional rights have been
invaded intentionally.
189. 451 U.S. at 540 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
190. 451 U.S. at 544.
191. Although found to be the determinative factor in denying a due process vi-
olation, the petitioner failed to raise the issue of the availability of a state law rem-
edy in either the district court or the court of appeals. As noted by Justice
Marshall, "[t] he issue was first presented in the petition for rehearing filed in the
In Monroe, Justice Douglas stated that the third function of sec-
tion 1983 was to provide a federal remedy where a state remedy,
though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. 192 Ar-
guably, Parratt presents such a situation. Justice Marshall placed
significance on the fact that the "respondent [was] a state pris-
oner whose access to information about his legal rights [was]
necessarily limited by his confinement."1 93 The prisoner pursued
his complaint concerning the missing hobby kit through the pris-
oner's grievance procedures, but was never informed about the
remedies available under state law. Justice Marshall states that if
prison officials fail to inform a prisoner of the available state rem-
edies "they should not be permitted to rely on the existence of
such remedies as adequate alternatives to a section 1983 action
for wrongful deprivation of property."' 94
Additional aspects of Justice Rehnquist's opinion are dis-
turbing. First, the decision revolves primarily around the Consti-
tution and ignores the statute, the vehicle under which the action
was commenced. The statute, as well as the Constitution itself,
by its terms, embodies a clear choice to bear the burden of the
costs to vindicate certain fundamental rights.95 Second, the
Court's reasoning places the proper analysis backwards; to start
with the common law and give the remains to the Constitution.
The grant of power from the supremacy clause makes the Consti-
tution the highest source of law in the land.196 The states may al-
ways go beyond the Constitution, but they may not provide
less.197 Accordingly, the Constitution should dictate the require-
ments of state laws, not vice versa.198
Court of Appeals." 451 U.S. at 556 n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). Respondent noted that it was the Attorney General's office that was
charged with responsibility for the investigation, evaluation, and settlement of
claims made under the state act. "Since the Attorney General's office had actual
knowledge of respondent's claim since the service of his complaint in April of 1976,
raising the applicability of the State Act for the first time four years later is disin-
genuous at best." Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 24 n.7, Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981).
192. 365 U.S. at 174; see supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
193. 451 U.S. at 555.
194. Justice Marshall would place an affirmative obligation on prison officials to
inform an inmate of any available state remedies. If prison officials failed to do so,
Justice Marshall would hold that the requirements of due process had not been
satisfied. Id. at 556.
195. See supra notes 13-38, 144-73 and accompanying text; Whitman, supra note
161, at 21-32.
196. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
197. See supra note 179.
198. However, the preclusion of section 1983 actions was limited to situations
where adequate state remedies exist. Therefore, the Court's decision has a built-
in "safety valve." Kirby, supra note 183, at 171. Accordingly, a plaintiff who is
wrongfully deprived of his property by a person acting under color of state law
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On the other hand, is there anything wrong with this practice?
Consistent with the emergence of the new federalism, the federal
government is diverting a constant stream of authority to the
state level. Judicial deference is merely another facet. The final
determination inevitably depends on the manner in which one
perceives the interactions of the state and federal governments.
3. What is a $23.50 Claim Doing in the Supreme Court of the
United States?
In his opening paragraph, Justice Rehnquist states that "[alt
first blush one might well inquire why respondent brought an ac-
tion in federal court to recover damages of such a small amount
for a negligent loss of property .. ."199 The inquiry is answered
by the latter half of the same sentence. "[Bjecause 28 U.S.C.
§1343,200 the predicate for the jurisdiction of the United States
District Court, contains no minimum dollar limitation, he was au-
thorized by Congress to bring his action under that section if he
met its requirements and if he stated a claim for relief under 42
U.S.C. §1983."201
Applying about $23.50 worth of analysis, the Court disposed of
one of the most controversial issues facing federal courts today:
whether apparently trivial claims justify the time and expense of
federal litigation. Persuasive arguments have been extended
from both sides of the dispute. Dating back to 1871, the Congress
contemplated that section 1983 actions would encompass moneta-
rily trivial claims. The language from the original congressional
debates was quoted in both Monroe v. Pape2 2 and Carey v.
Piphus: 203
may still seek a federal remedy under section 1983 if state remedies are inade-
quate. This conclusion will inevitably result in considerable differences of opinion
concerning judicial line drawing between what constitutes adequate and inade-
quate state remedies.
199. 451 U.S. at 529.
200. The jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983 is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). Like
§ 1983, the statute was originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, § 1
(1871). It provides that federal district courts shall have original jurisdiction, with-
out regard to the amount in controversy, over civil actions brought "[t]o redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law. . ." of any constitutional right, and
of any right "secured. . .by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citi-
zens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1976).
201. 451 U.S. at 529.
202. 365 U.S. at 180.
203. 435 U.S. 247, 255 n.9 (1978) (action by public school students pursuant to
The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable character, the dam-
ages in the estimation of any sensible man may not be five dollars or even
five cents; they may be what lawyers call merely nominal damages; and
yet by this section jurisdiction of that civil action is given to the Federal
courts instead of its being prosecuted as now in the courts of the
States.
20 4
Apparently Congress must have concluded that cases which raise
constitutional issues deserve special attention-a special forum.
Although the conditions in this country have changed dramati-
cally since 1871,205 the fact that Congress has chosen to leave the
statute intact evidences a continuing congressional expression
that a supplemental remedy is still required today. A straightfor-
ward justification for the federal remedy is that because the inter-
ests being asserted are significantly different from a state right
and have been granted the protection of the federal Constitution
they accordingly deserve a federal forum.206
But every coin has two sides. If one justification were labeled
symbolic, the turn of the coin would reveal the practical side. The
desire to reduce, or at least stabilize, the federal case load is an
extremely serious practical problem. 20 7 As noted by Justice
Powell:
The present case [Parratt v. Taylor], involving a $23 loss, illustrates the
extent to which constitutional law has been trivialized, and federal courts
often have been converted into small-claims tribunals. There is little justi-
fication for making such a claim a federal case, requiring a decision by a
district court, an appeal as a matter of right to a court of appeals, and po-
tentially, consideration of petition for certiorari in this Court. It is not in
the interest of claimants or of society for disputes of this kind to be re-
solved by litigation that may take years, particularly in an overburdened
§ 1983 against school officials, where the students had been suspended from school
without procedural due process).
204. GLOBE App., supra note 14, at 216.
205. See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
206. See 365 U.S. at 196 (comments by Justice Harlan).
207. The burden of the federal caseload is Chief Justice Burger's most consis-
tent complaint. See supra note 162. A recent A.B.A. Journal article indicated the
ever increasing pressures of the Court's case load:
In surprisingly frank remarks, three Supreme Court justices told annual
meeting sessions that their workloads are becoming too burdensome and
may even be affecting the administration of justice. Already facing a dock-
et full through February, "what this means is that we shall not be current
in our work" said Justice Byron White. "Cases will be ready for argu-
ment, and we shall not be ready for them."
Speaking before the American Judicature Society, Justice John Paul Ste-
vens said the court is "too busy to decide whether there was anything we
could do about the problem of being too busy .... "
Powell pointed to the thousands of state prisoners' suits, both civil rights
and habeas corpus cases, now in the federal district courts, and declared
that "the time has come for considering means of limiting collateral re-
view by federal courts of state convictions to cases of manifest injustice
where the issue is guilt or innocence."
Middleton, High Court's Case Load Too Heavy: Three Justices, 68 A.B.A. J. 1201
(1982).
608
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federal system that never was designed to be utilized in this way.
20 8
One major factor which has contributed to the ever increasing
burden of the federal caseload is the unique situation surround-
ing prisoner litigation. One restraint on unwarranted litigation is
expense. Litigants limited by the realities of time and expense
are deterred from bringing a suit when the chances of ultimate
success are slight. However, such is not the case in the field of
prisoner litigation, because most civil rights actions are brought in
forma pauperis.2O9 Undeterred by financial constraints, a pris-
oner has nothing to lose by commencing frivolous actions. Conse-
quently, the resulting proliferation of prisoner litigation.
The proliferation has a detrimental effect upon the entire pro-
cess. Damage to the system occurs because the sheer quantity of
section 1983 actions, regardless of their respective merit, ulti-
mately must denigrate all rights, simply because the judiciary is
incapable of sympathetically responding to each and every claim.
The curiosity and wonderment experienced at the sight of the ini-
tial snowflake soon dissipates upon the arrival of the blizzard. As
a matter of self-preservation, judges may begin to read complaints
from a less than sympathetic standpoint, searching for narrow
resolutions to avoid complex constitutional issues. 2 10 Such an
outlook is not the fault of the judiciary, but rather a natural reac-
tion to an impossible situation. The ultimate result may demote
judging to an onerous and boring administrative chore. 21 '
208. 451 U.S. at 554 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
209. Informa pauperis is a procedure whereby a court grants permission to an
indigent to proceed without liability for court fees or costs.
However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976), a court may dismiss a complaint in a
forma pauperis proceeding if the court is satisfied that the suit is "frivolous" or
"malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) provides in part that "[tlhe court... may dismiss
a case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivo-
lous or malicious." Id. Despite this device, its infrequent use has failed to signifi-
cantly reduce the federal caseload. Cf. Foster v. Jacob, 297 F. Supp. 299 (C.D. Cal.
1969):
This does not mean that we must review every diagnosis by a prison doc-
tor or vindicate every prisoner who gets into an insolvent "your another"
type of argument with a guard and receives a punch in the process. The
action is frivolous and it accordingly is dismissed, under authority of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Id. at 300. The problem involving property actions is determining what constitutes
a frivolous monetary amount, especially when considering that § 1983 requires no
minimum jurisdictional dollar value. Additionally, a deprivation of five dollars or
less may constitute a loss of all the money an indigent prisoner has.
210. See Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in
the Federal Court, 92 HARv. L. REV. 610, 638 n.144 (1979).
211. See Whitman, supra note 161, at 27.
Regardless of which side of the coin one chooses, reality cries
out for a remedy. The obvious solution to reducing the caseload
would involve congressional action. Section 1983 could be re-
worded in a narrower, more carefully articulated fashion, or a ju-
risdictional amount requirement could be imposed for property
cases. 2 12 Absent such legislation, the courts will continue to
search for narrowing devices. Unable to question the clear mean-
ing of section 1983, an almost irrepressible remedy, the Court has
chosen to limit the protections granted by the Constitution itself.
V. IMPACT OF THE CASE
Parratt v. Taylor is not an earthshaking decision. Regardless of
the Court's determination, the republic will not fall. However,
like the individual pieces of an intricate puzzle, the decision has a
separate and important function. While readily stating that negli-
gent conduct can constitute a constitutional deprivation,2 13 like
any great prestidigitator, Justice Rehnquist appears more con-
cerned with limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Appar-
ently, by allowing a negligence based cause of action under
section 1983 the Court has expanded the scope of its jurisdiction.
But the Court goes on. Having found a negligence based claim to
exist, the Court decides that the appropriate forum for such an
action is a state court-where state negligence concepts are
clearly defined. The Court has decided that: (1) a negligent ac-
tion is sufficient to state a federal cause of action under section
1983, and (2) the violation of this federal right should be remedied
in the state courts. Therefore, the Court has finally succeeded in
diverting federal section 1983 actions to the state courts.
The impact of the decision is not so much what it says but what
it does. First, the decision not only fails to recognize or distin-
guish relevant precedent, but it does so without any contrary au-
thority or analysis.214 Under the guise of articulating a working
standard for the lower courts,2 15 the Court may have created a
larger theoretical gap than the one which it sought to close. Such
212. In Parratt, Justice Powell stated the need for congressional reform:
"[P] erhaps the time has come for a revision of this century-old statute-a revision
that would clarify its scope while preserving its historical function of protecting
individual rights from unlawful state action." 451 U.S. at 555 n.13.
213. 451 U.S. at 534-37.
214. Monroe and Baker, the two cases relied on by the Court in reaching its
state of mind requirement, appear to imply that the standard of conduct necessary
to establish a § 1983 action depends upon the nature of the alleged deprivation.
Furthermore, Estell cannot be meaningfully distinguished simply because it in-
volved the eighth amendment.
215. 451 U.S. at 533-34.
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a decision can only serve to denigrate the authority and esteem of
the Supreme Court.
Second, Justice Rehnquist ostensibly assumes that section 1983
and the due process clause are coextensive. 216 The analysis of the
deprivation argument operates interchangeably between the due
process clause and section 1983. Section 1983 was not enacted for
the purpose of codifying the fourteenth amendment. Rather, it
was intended as a broad remedial act to provide remedies which
were not currently available under the Constitution.217 To regard
the two as co-extensive is to misconstrue the function of section
1983.
The more interesting inquiry is why the Court has chosen to re-
gard the separate provisions as interchangeable. The answer
must exist somewhere in the Court's unexpressed intentions.
The following possible answer is presented for consideration. The
Court finds itself faced with a seemingly irrepressible remedy,
section 1983. Precedent, the broad language of the statute, and a
clear legislative history make a supportable narrowing of the stat-
ute itself impossible. The Constitution, on the other hand, is a
two hundred year old, ambiguously drafted, constantly inter-
preted document. Therefore, by construing the two as co-exten-
sive, a limiting of the due process clause-traditionally regarded
as a judicially evolving creature-by necessary inference also lim-
its section 1983. A determination that no fourteenth amendment
violation exists simultaneously removes any predicate for a sec-
tion 1983 action. Judicial sleight of hand masterfully performed.
The final piece of the puzzle has yet to be positioned. The
Court has apparently left a safety valve in its holding; that if the
state fails to provide an adequate remedy, the plaintiff is theoreti-
cally allowed to bring his section 1983 action in federal court.218
However, there is a problem when theory is transformed into
reality.
Let us assume, arguendo, that subsequent to the decision in
Parratt, the State of Nebraska chooses to repeal the state based
post-deprivation remedy. Additionally, let us imagine that Taylor
orders another hobby kit which is shipped to him and is again lost
by unidentified individuals. Unable to identify the wrongdoer, the
216. Id. at 532-39.
217. See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
218. 451 U.S. at 543-44.
prisoner is without a defendant. Assuming the prison supervisors
have acted in good faith and without sufficient knowledge of such
actions, the negligent actions of the prison personnel could not be
imputed to them. 219 The doctrine of respondeat superior is not an
available remedy because it is generally held inapplicable to sec-
tion 1983 actions.220 Therefore, no state remedy exists.
Although the deprivation was committed by prison officials, it is
the lack of a post-deprivation remedy which the Court finds to
constitute a violation of due process. Thus, the true party who
has deprived the prisoner of due process is the state, for it has
failed to provide the remedy, not the original wrongdoer. Faced
with no other alternative, the prisoner commences a federal ac-
tion against the state and its legislators for a violation of his due
process. However, both are immune from suit in federal court.221
The prisoner is without a remedy. What happened to his due
process?
Consequently, although the Court states that a federal remedy
is open under section 1983 when the state fails to provide a rem-
edy, in fact, the Court has finally found a way to preclude such
actions in the federal courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Parratt v. Taylor raises serious questions concerning the unex-
pressed motivations of the Supreme Court. Recent developments
appear to suggest that the Court, in searching for methods to re-
lieve its congested docket, has chosen to substantially curtail fed-
eral jurisdiction: limiting federal habeas corpus review of state
decisions on fourth amendment claims; 22 2 holding that state judg-
ments are entitled to full res judicata effect in federal civil rights
litigation;223 and its ruling that the federal courts may not con-
219. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The mere "failure to act [even] in
the face of a statistical pattern" of incidents of misconduct was held to be insuffi-
cient as a basis of liability. Id. at 376; Hayes v. Jefferson County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869
(6th Cir. 1982).
220. See Developments, supra note 30, at 1207.
221. See supra note 184.
222. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The respondent was convicted of mur-
der in state court, based in part upon testimony concerning a revolver found on
his person when he was arrested because of a violation of a vagrancy ordinance.
The trial court rejected the petitioner's contentions that the arrest was illegal be-
cause the ordinance was unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed. Respon-
dent subsequently applied for habeas corpus relief in the federal district court.
The Supreme Court held that where the state has provided a full and fair opportu-
nity for litigation of a fourteenth amendment claim, a prisoner will not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds that the evidence seized was
unconstitutional.
223. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Respondent, following a denial to
suppress certain evidence on fourth and fourteenth amendment grounds, was con-
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sider fourteenth amendment challenges to state taxing practices
so long as adequate state remedies exist.22 4
Perhaps more disturbing than the end which the Court is pur-
suing is the means chosen to effectuate the policy. Initially, the
Court failed in its analysis to distinguish relevant precedent as
well as to justify its current position. Second, the Court chose to
do indirectly what it could not have done directly, namely, narrow
the scope and remedies of section 1983. The Court did so by
equating statutory provisions and the Constitution. The process
not only disregards the intent of Congress, but unnecessarily lim-
its the protections available under the fourteenth amendment.
Third, while implying federal judicial expansion of section 1983,
by finding negligence actionable, the Court actually demoted con-
stitutional violations to the state courts.
There are two possible solutions to the burden of section 1983
actions which have yet to be attempted. The first and most obvi-
ous remedy would be legislative reform. The present case demon-
strates the extent to which the Constitution has been trivialized.
There is little justification for the time and expense devoted to
this $23.50 controversy except for the statute itself. Clearly the
framers of the Ku Klux Klan Act never intended such a distortion
of the Act's purpose. The statute should be amended to more
carefully parallel the original purpose of the statute.
Nonetheless, an additional avenue is available. The Court could
make an honest reexamination of the statute itself. Should Con-
gress fail to amend the statute, the Court could redefine the pur-
pose and limitations of the statute. A de minimis threshold,
already recognized in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d),225 could be more strin-
gently judicially enforced to prevent the flood of unnecessary and
trivial litigation which currently clogs the federal docket. This is
not to suggest that a certain dollar value should be required to
reach a constitutional level. However, the federal bench, particu-
larly at the district court level, could dismiss actions which simply
victed in state court. Nevertheless, he sought federal court redress and com-
menced a § 1983 action against the officers who had seized the evidence. The
Court held that collateral estoppel prevented the respondent from relitigating the
evidence question already decided against him at the state court level.
224. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981). The
Court based its decision upon the principle of comity which was held to bar the
taxpayer's damage action brought in the federal courts under § 1983 to redress the
allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax system.
225. See supra note 209.
do not require federal consideration. Such an honest examination
of the one hundred and twenty two year old statute would be
preferable to the methods currently employed by the Court.
However, until Congress decides to limit section 1983-which
may never occur-the Court appears determined to further limit
the scope of section 1983 and by implication, based on Parratt, to
limit the scope of the Constitution itself.226 How far the Court in-
tends to pursue its course remains to be seen.227
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226. Parratt has been cited by over one hundred federal courts in the last year.
The lower federal courts appear to be using the case as a limiting device on fed-
eral jurisdiction where other adequate remedies exist. See Steffen v. Housewright,
665 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1981) (the Arkansas claims statute precluded a finding of a
deprivation without due process of law); Cline v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 525 F.
Supp. 825 (D.S.D. 1981) (the availability of the Federal Tort Claims Act precluded
a violation of due process).
227. After the expenditure of massive amounts of legal services, the prisoner
still did not receive his $23.50. Parratt's $23.50 was returned to him by private
donations.
